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EDUCATION LAW - ACT 88 - PUBLIC EMPLOYE RELATIONS ACT -
TEACHERS' STRIKES - COURTS OF EQUITY - MANDATORY NEGOTI-
ATIONS-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that state courts
may order a school district and teachers' association to partici-
pate in court-monitored negotiations when the courts grant the
Secretary of Education an injunction ending a teachers' strike.
Carroll v. Ringgold Educ. Ass'n, 680 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1996).
The Ringgold Education Association (the "Association"), Ring-
gold School District (the "District") and Ringgold Board of School
Directors (the "Board") were parties to a collective bargaining
agreement.' When the collective bargaining agreement expired
on August 31, 1993, the District and Association were unable to
reach a new agreement for the ensuing 1993-1994 school year.2
Notwithstanding the lack of agreement, however, the academic
school year began as scheduled.3
On February 9, 1994, the Association commenced a strike that
subsequently ended when the Association and District agreed to
extend the original collective bargaining agreement until a new
agreement could be reached.4 The Association, District and
Board then entered into Act 88 negotiations that included media-
tion, fact-finding and final best offer arbitration.5 After the Dis-
trict and Board refused to adhere to the arbitrator's decision, the
1. Carroll v. Ringgold Educ. Ass'n, 680 A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa. 1996). The Associa-
tion is comprised of public school professional employees in the District. Reproduced Rec-
ord at 42a, Carroll v. Ringgold, 680 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1996). The Association bargains with
the District as to the Association members' terms of employment. Id. The Board is the
District's elected governing body. Id. at 42a-43a. A collective bargaining agreement is an
agreement between a labor union and employer that governs the duration and conditions
of employment. BLAcsS LAw DICTIONARY 263 (6th ed. 1990).
2. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1139.
3. Carroll v. Ringgold Educ. Ass'n, 655 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
4. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1139. The strike ended on February 11, 1994. Id.
5. Id. Act 88 is the collective bargaining article of the Public School Code of 1949.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 11-1101-A-11-1172-A (West Supp. 1996). Mediation is the
"[pirivate, informal dispute resolution process in which a neutral third person, the media-
tor, helps disputing parties reach an agreement." BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 981 (6th ed.
1990). Fact-finding is the process by which a business, government or court-appointed
person determines and reports on facts pertaining to a particular dispute. Id. at 592.
Final best offer arbitration is defined in Act 88 as arbitration under which the arbitrator's
award is restricted to the last offer of the employer, the last offer of the employees or the
fact-finder's recommendations. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1123-A (West Supp. 1996).
939
Duquesne Law Review
Association initiated its second strike.6 Prior to this strike, Dis-
trict students had received one hundred sixty-three days of
instruction.7
On June 7, 1994, the Secretary of Education (the "Secretary")
filed a complaint in equity and a petition for a preliminary
injunction8 with the Washington County Court of Common Pleas
(the "Chancellor"), naming the Association, District and Board as
defendants.9 The Secretary requested the Chancellor to issue a
decree ordering the Association to end its strike and resume stu-
dent instruction. 10 The Secretary also asked the Chancellor to
order the District to schedule, before June 30, 1994, the remain-
der of the one hundred eighty days of student instruction
required by the Public School Code of 1949.11
On June 7, 1994, the Chancellor granted by decree the Secre-
tary's request for injunctive relief. 2 The same day, the Chancel-
lor issued a second decree repeating verbatim the order of the
first decree and including an additional order for court-monitored
negotiations between the Association and Board.13
Although none of the parties contested the Chancellor's grant
of injunctive relief, the District and Board contested the order for
court-monitored negotiations by filing an application for relief
and a stay of the order.' 4 The Chancellor, relying on Armstrong
Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong Educ. Ass'n,'5 rejected the application.'
6
6. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1139. The second strike began on May 25, 1994. Id.
7. Id.
8. An injunction is a "court order prohibiting someone from doing some specified
act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury." BLAcis LAw DICTIoNARY
784 (6th ed. 1990).
9. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1139. The Secretary exercised his authority under sec-
tion 11-1161-A of Act 88, which provides:
When an employe organization is on strike for an extended period that would not
permit the school entity to provide the period of instruction required by section
1501 by June 30, the Secretary of Education may initiate, in the appropriate
county court of common pleas, appropriate injunctive proceedings providing for the
required period of instructions.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1161-A (West Supp. 1996).
10. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1139.
11. Id. The only response to this request by the parties was the Association's sub-
mission of a motion for court-monitored negotiations. Id. Section 15-1501 of the Public
School Code provides that "[aill public kindergartens, elementary, and secondary schools
shall be kept open each school year for at least one hundred eighty (180) days of instruc-
tion for pupils." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1501 (West 1992).
12. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1139.
13. Id.
14. Id. A stay is "a suspension of the case or some designated proceedings within
it." BLACes LAw DIcTIoNARY 1413 (6th ed. 1990).
15. 595 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1991). See infra note 32 for a description of the Armstrong
case.
16. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1139-40. In Armstrong, the court affirmed an equity
court's decision to order court-monitored negotiations between a district and teachers'
940 Vol. 35:939
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The Chancellor reasoned that Armstrong applied to this case
because the injunction provisions of Act 88 and the Public
Employe Relations Act ("PERA") must be construed together.
17
The District and Board appealed the order for court-monitored
negotiations on the ground that the Chancellor exceeded its
authority by including the order in the June 7 decree.18 On
appeal, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed the
contested order, finding that the Chancellor indeed lacked
authority to issue the decree. 19 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court then granted allocatur in the case to define the powers of
an equity court when acting on a Secretary's Act 88 request for
injunctive relief.20
On appeal, the supreme court held that the injunctive provi-
sions of PERA and Act 88 are consistent with each other and
must be construed and applied together.21 Additionally, the
court concluded that the case law analyzing section 1101.1003 of
PERA applies to section 11-1161-A of Act 88, and, consequently,
the Chancellor correctly applied Armstrong in issuing the decree
granting the Secretary's injunctive relief.22 The court then held
the Chancellor possessed and properly exercised the authority to
association in addition to its order for injunctive relief under section 1101.1003 of the
Public Employee Relations Act (PERA"), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (West
1991)). Armstrong, 595 A.2d at 1139. Section 1101.1003 of PERA reads:
If a strike by public employes occurs .... it shall not be prohibited unless or until
such a strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or
welfare of the public. In such cases the public employer shall initiate, in the court
of common pleas of the jurisdiction where such strike occurs, an action for equita-
ble relief including but not limited to appropriate injunctions and shall be entitled
to such relief if the court finds that the strike creates a clear and present danger or
threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. If the strike involves Common-
wealth employes, the chief legal officer of the public employer or the Attorney Gen-
eral where required by law shall institute an action for equitable relief in the court
of common pleas of the jurisdiction where the strike has occurred or the Common-
wealth Court.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (West 1991).
17. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1139. The court actually stated that these acts must be
read 'in pari materia." Id. "In pari materia" is "a rule of statutory construction [by
which] statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read, construed and
applied together so that the legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the
enactments...." BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 791 (6th ed. 1990).
18. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1140.
19. Id. The commonwealth court agreed with the argument of the District and
Board that Act 88 does not empower the Chancellor to order court-monitored negotia-
tions. Id. Furthermore, the commonwealth court cited a footnote from Reichley by Wall
v. North Penn Sch. Dist., 626 A.2d 123 (Pa. 1993), for the proposition that Act 88
"remove[s] public school employees from the scope of PERA" and thereby renders the
Armstrong decision inapplicable. Id. Thus, the commonwealth court found neither statu-
tory nor case law authority to support the Chancellor's decree. Id.
20. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1140.
21. Id. at 1141-42.
22. Id. at 1143-44.
Duquesne Law Review
order the Association and Board to participate in court-moni-
tored negotiations, even though the Secretary's original prayer
for relief included only a request for injunctive relief.23 In conclu-
sion, the supreme court reversed the commonwealth court's
decision.24
The supreme court majority began its analysis by observing
that section 1101.1003 of PERA is the statutory source for a dis-
trict's or school board's right to seek injunctive relief from a
strike instituted by a teachers' association.25 The court then
cited Armstrong for the proposition that a chancellor who grants
a district's request for injunctive relief from a strike under PERA
also possesses the authority to require court-monitored negotia-
tions between a teachers' association and the district's board.
26
Next, the court recognized that Act 88, pursuant to which the
Secretary filed for injunctive relief in this case, requires courts to
construe together section 1101.1003 of PERA and section 11-
1161-A of Act 88.27 The majority also noted that Act 88 repealed
23. Id. at 1144.
24. Id. at 1140.
25. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1141. Chief Justice Nix and Justice Newman did not
participate in the discussion or decision. Id. at 1144. Justice Zappala filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Castille joined. Id.
Before commencing its analysis, the court acknowledged that the issue was now
"technically" moot due to the Association's and Board's November 2, 1995 ratification of a
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1140. The court declared that it should deter-
mine the issue on the merits, however, because it was one that was "capable of repetition,
but likely to evade review." Id.
The court also denied the Secretary's motion to strike portions of the Associa-
tion's brief that addressed the Chancellor's issuance of the injunction and the equivalence
of the Chancellor's standards under PERA and Act 88. Id. at 1140, 1141. The court
agreed with the Secretary's argument that the Secretary had waived those issues in the
appeal to the commonwealth court, and that the waiver precluded the Association from
raising the issues for the first time on appeal to the supreme court. Id. at 1140. Nonethe-
less, the court denied the Secretary's motion since the issue of the Chancellor's authority
necessarily involved an analysis of the Chancellor's powers under both PERA and Act 88.
Id. at 1141.
The term "public employer" in section 1101.1003 is defined to include both school
districts and the boards of school districts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 1101.301 (West 1991).
26. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1141. In Armstrong, a school district filed a complaint in
equity pursuant to section 1101.1003 of PERA and requested that the chancellor enjoin a
teachers' association's strike. Armstrong, 595 A.2d at 1140. The chancellor granted the
requested relief, but made the injunction contingent upon the participation of the board
and association in daily negotiations until they reached an agreement. Id. at 1141. In
upholding the chancellor's decision, the supreme court noted that PERA does not reduce
any of the powers inherent in an equity court and courts of equity retain jurisdiction for
all purposes when they retain jurisdiction over a case. Id. at 1143.
27. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1141. Section 6 of Act 88 reads: "[PERA] is to be read in
pari materia with the addition of Article XI-A of the [Public School Code], but [PERA] is
repealed insofar as it is clearly inconsistent with the addition of Article XI-A of the Act."
Historical and Statutory Notes, Section 6 of Act 1992, July 9, P.L. 403, No. 88, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101-A (West Supp. 1996)(Historical and Statutory Notes).
Vol. 35:939942
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any inconsistent provisions of PERA.2s After observing that
PERA provides school districts and school boards with a right to
seek injunctive relief from strikes by teachers' associations and
Act 88 provides the Secretary of Education with such a right, the
court found the statutes to be consistent with respect to the
availability of injunctive relief in strike situations. 29 Thus, Act
88 did not repeal section 1101.1003 of PERA.3 0 The court then
held that the Chancellor correctly ascertained the extent of her
equitable powers by applying PERA case law to the Secretary's
request for injunctive relief under Act 88.31
Turning to the issue of whether the Chancellor properly uti-
lized the Armstrong decision in support of its order to the Associ-
ation and Board to negotiate, the court reaffirmed the Armstrong
holding that PERA establishes a court of equity's authority to
issue injunctive relief to school boards and districts contingent
upon compliance with court-imposed conditions or regulations.32
28. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1141.
29. Id. Section 1101.1003 of PERA provides for injunctive relief if the association's
strike "creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety, or welfare of the
public." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1101.1003 (West 1991). Section 11-1161-A of Act 88 pro-
vides for injunctive relief if the association's strike jeopardizes the one hundred eighty
days per year of student instruction mandated by section 15-1501 of Act 88. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1161-A (West Supp. 1996).
30. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1142.
31. Id. at 1143. Before stating this holding, the court rejected the argument of the
District and Board that the commonwealth court had properly ruled that Act 88 removed
public educators from the scope of PERA, and that the removal precluded an in pari
materia reading and construction of the two statutes. Id. For support, the District and
Board cited Reichley, 626 A.2d at 125, for the proposition that Act 88 had "effectively
removed" public educators from PERA's scope. Id. The court observed that the Reichley
court was addressing the constitutionality of the teachers' right to strike under PERA
and not whether Act 88 repealed PERA or the propriety of construing Act 88 and PERA
together. Id. Since the Reichley court did not address the issue presented in Ringgold,
the Ringgold majority classified the Reichley statement as mere obiter dicta and declared
that the commonwealth court improperly relied upon obiter dicta in reaching its conclu-
sion. Id. Obiter dicta refers to remarks "made... by a judge, in his decision upon a cause
... not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in
the determination of the cause." BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1072 (6th ed. 1990).
32. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1143. In Armstrong, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected the Armstrong School District's contention that PERA restricts a chancellor's
powers to granting injunctive relief. Armstrong, 595 A.2d at 1141. The Armstrong School
District had reasoned that this limitation precluded the chancellor's ability to require the
Armstrong School Board and Armstrong Education Association to engage in court-moni-
tored negotiations. Id. The Armstrong court quoted section 1101.101 of PERA for the
public policy and purpose of PERA. Id. at 1142. This section of PERA provides that the
policy is "to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers
and their employees subject, however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this Com-
monwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety and welfare." P.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101. 101 (West 1991). Additionally, the Armstrong court cited sec-
tion 1101.1003 of PERA for the language setting forth that district initiated actions for
equitable relief include but are not limited to "appropriate injunctions." Armstrong, 595
A.2d at 1142 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (West 1991)).
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The court then cited Armstrong as valid case law for the follow-
ing three propositions.-- 'First, in order to reach a just decision
that adequately protects the interests of all parties involved in a
labor dispute, an equity court retains jurisdiction for all purposes
pertaining to the dispute once it retains jurisdiction over the dis-
pute.14 Necessarily, this power to protect the interests of all par-
ties extends to providing relief not actually requested by the
parties.35 Second, equity courts possess an inherent power to
enforce their decrees.36 Third, the rationale that it is "just and
proper" for a court of equity to make a school district's injunctive
relief from a strike under PERA contingent upon the district's
participation in court-monitored negotiations is equally applica-
ble when the Secretary seeks such an injunction under Act 88Y
The court finally concluded that based on these valid proposi-
tions of law, the Chancellor properly ordered the Board and Asso-
ciation in this case to participate in court-monitored negotiations
upon granting the Secretary's prayer for injunctive relief.38 Con-
sequently, the court reversed the order of the commonwealth
court.
3 9
Justice Zappala authored a dissent in Ringgold criticizing the
majority's use of Armstrong to support its holding in the case.4'
Specifically, Justice Zappala distinguished the origins of Act 88
and PERA injunctive relief and concluded that the majority dis-
regarded these differences when it analyzed Armstrong .41 More-
over, the dissent argued that although the Armstrong court




37. Id. The Armstrong court had declared that by subjecting the parties to the
duty to bargain until an agreement is reached, an equity court can balance the equities
when issuing injunctive relief to a school district or school board and thus equitably
resolve the entire controversy. Armstrong, 595 A.2d at 1143.
38. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1144.
39. Id.
40. Id. (Zappala, J., dissenting). The dissent observed that the legislature's post-
Armstrong enactment of Act 88 changed the school board-teachers' association's collective
bargaining process by imposing mandatory non-binding arbitration on the parties. Id.
The dissent then declared that the legislature had restricted teachers' strikes by empow-
ering the Secretary to enforce the one hundred eighty day student instruction limitation
of Act 88. Id.
41. Id. at 1144-45. The origin of Act 88 injunctive relief lies with the Secretary's
power to enforce the one hundred eighty day instruction limitation. Id. at 1144. The
origin of PERA injunctive relief lies with a school board's power to request relief to end a
controversy between a school district and teachers' association. Id. Justice Zappala rea-
soned that to apply Armstrong to both situations was to improperly treat a Secretary's
request as if it was a school board's request. Id. at 1145. The dissent cited Masloff v. Port
Authority of Allegheny County, 613 A.2d 1186 (Pa. 1992), for the proposition that the
arbitration provisions that apply to an employer's request for injunctive relief are not
Vol. 35:939944
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correctly applied equity principles when it forced the district
seeking equitable relief in that case to "do equity," the Ringgold
majority misapplied equity principles by forcing the co-defend-
ants in that case to "do equity."42
Justice Zappala stated that the majority engaged in such mis-
use of equity law by relying on the powers of an equity court to
overcome a mere procedural irregularity present in the Associa-
tion's "Motion for Court Ordered Bargaining."43 Justice Zappala
argued that this use of equitable powers necessarily results in
judicial involvement in all facets of labor controversies, regard-
less of how the controversies are brought before the courts.44
Justice Zappala concluded by declaring this result as clearly
inconsistent with the recognized Pennsylvania rule that courts
may exercise only those equitable powers granted to them by the
legislature.45
The Pennsylvania Legislature enacted Act 88 in order to pro-
vide an equitable solution to teacher-school board contract dis-
putes and problems arising from teachers' strikes.46 The
legislature intended Act 88 to amend and be construed together
with PERA.47 When passing Act 88, the legislature was atten-
applicable when a third party seeks injunctive relief for the purposes of protecting his or
her own rights or interests. Id. at 1145.
42. Id. at 1145. Justice Zappala cited the equitable maxim "[hie who seeks equity
must do equity." Id. The maxim indicates that a party who invokes a court's equitable
powers in order to be treated with "fairness, justness, and right dealing" must expect that
the opposing party will also be treated in this manner. See BLAcis LAw DICTIoNARY 540
(6th ed. 1991).
43. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1145. Justice Zappala asserted that Pennsylvania Rule
of Civil Procedure 2252(d) requires the Association to raise the issue of bargaining in its
answer as new matter. Id. Rule 2252(d) reads:
If the person sought to be joined is a party, the joining party shall.. . assert in his
answer as new matter that such party is... liable to the joining party directly
setting forth the ground therefor. The case shall proceed thereafter as if such
party had, been joined by a writ or a complaint.
PA. R. Civ. P. 2252(d).
44. Ringgold, 680 A.2d at 1145.
45. Id.
46. 175 PA. LEGIs. J.- SENATE 46, 872 (1991). Senator Greenwood, noting his con-
cern for the effects that bargaining impasses have on taxpayers and children, stated that
a resolution of such impasses should not come at the expense of the teachers' sanctioned
methods of bargaining. Id. Senator Reibman also called for a solution that would be
"fair" to teachers, children and school beards (as representatives of the citizens and tax-
payers). Id. at 1135.
47. Id. at 883, 1152; Historical and Statutory Notes, Section 6 of Act 1992, July 9,
P.L. 403, No. 88, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101-A (West Supp. 1996)(Historical and
Statutory Notes). Section 6 indicates that PERA is still applicable to teachers in their
capacities as public employees. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 11-1101-A (West Supp. 1996)(His-
torical and Statutory Notes). Section 6 reads, in pertinent part: "the Public Employe
Relations Act ... is repealed insofar as it is clearly inconsistent with the addition of
Article XI-A of [Act 88]." Id. Section 6 requires that PERA and Act 88 be construed in
pari materia. Id.
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tive to the effect of conferring powers on the Secretary of Educa-
tion, and, therefore, understood section 11-1161-A of Act 88 to be
a vital section of Act 88.48 The inclusion of this section, which
specifies narrow grounds for the Secretary's intervention in a
teachers' strike, also confirmed the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court's prior holding in Carroll v. New Castle Bd. of Sch.
Directors49 that the Secretary cannot compel a school board or
district to commence PERA injunctive relief proceedings.5 °
The scope of a chancellor's powers when hearing the Secre-
tary's requests for injunctive relief under Act 88 was an issue of
first impression in the Commonwealth in Ringgold."' The legis-
Senator Greenwood indicated that Act 88 is a physical amendment to the Public
School Code of 1949, but that Act 88 actually amended PERA. 175 PA. LEGiS. J. - SENATE
63, 1140 (1991). The reason for placing a PERA amendment under the School Code was
to avoid creating a fear among noneducation public employees that the legislature was
interfering with their collective bargaining rights. Id.
48. 176 PA. LEGIS. J. - SENATE 25, 1838 (1992). The state senate rejected two pro-
posals of Senator Bortner that would have resulted in granting the Secretary the power to
seek an injunction enjoining a teachers' strike. 175 PA. LEGIS. J. - SENATE 63, 1140-1143
(1991). The first proposal would have enabled the Secretary to act if a teachers' associa-
tion failed to provide forty-eight hours notice before striking. Id. at 1140. The second
proposal would have enabled the Secretary to act according to section 1101.1003 of PERA
if he or she judged a teachers' strike to be creating "a clear and present danger" to public
health, safety or welfare. Id. at 1142. After debate, the state senate rejected both propos-
als. Id. at 1142, 1143. In its final form, Act 88 included section 11-1161-A because of the
detrimental impact that unchecked violations of the one hundred and eighty day instruc-
tion requirement of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1501 (West 1992) would cause. 176 PA.
LEGIS. J. - SENATE 25, 1838 (1992).
49. No. 359 Misc. Dkt. 1990 (Pa. Comm. Ct. Nov. 30, 1990).
50. 175 PA. LEGIS. J. - SENATE 63, 1142 (1991). In Carroll, the duration of the
teachers' strike precluded completion of the requisite one hundred and eighty days of
instruction. Brief for Appellee, Secretary of Education at D-14, Carroll v. Ringgold Educ.
Ass'n, 680 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1996). As a result, the Secretary sought a writ of mandamus
compelling the school beard to commence an equity action under PERA seeking to enjoin
the strike. Id. at D-10. The commonwealth court denied the Secretary's request because
writs of mandamus cannot be used to force a party to take discretionary actions, and the
maintenance of an action in equity necessarily entails discretion. Id. at D-21. A "writ of
mandamus" is:
[A] writ... which issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is directed to a
private or municipal corporation, or any of its officers, or to an executive, adminis-
trative or judicial officer, or to an inferior court, commanding the performance of a
particular act therein specified, and belonging to his or their public, official, or min-
isterial duty, or directing the restoration of the complainant to rights or privileges
of which he has been illegally deprived.
BLACiKs LAw DIcTIONARY 961 (6th ed. 1990).
51. There have been common pleas court decisions in which the Secretary has
acted pursuant to Act 88 and requested an injunction enjoining a teachers' strike, and
these decisions have included grants of relief without orders for court-monitored negotia-
tions as well as grants of relief with such orders. Compare Carroll v. Center Area Educ.
Ass'n, No. 10882-1994, slip op. at 1 (Beaver Co. C.P., May 16, 1994) in Brief for Appellee,
Secretary of Education at D-5, Carroll v. Ringgold Educ. Ass'n, 680 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1996)
with Carroll v. Bethlehem-Center Educ. Ass'n, No. 95-232 (Wash. Co. C.P., Jan. 21, 1994)
in Brief of Amicus Curiae, Pennsylvania Educ. Ass'n at Appendix D, Carroll v. Ringgold,
680 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1996).
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lature's requirement that Act 88 and PERA be construed
together, however, rendered PERA case law pertaining to the
scope of a chancellor's powers upon hearing a school board's
request to enjoin a teachers' strike applicable to this issue.52
One case involving the issue of the scope of a chancellor's pow-
ers under PERA was Armstrong Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong Educ.
Ass'n.53 In Armstrong, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined
a chancellor's powers as they apply to equity actions brought
under PERA by school districts.54 The issue confronting the
Armstrong court was whether a chancellor could require a school
board and teachers' association to attend court-monitored negoti-
ations when the chancellor had granted the school district's
PERA request to enjoin the teachers' strike.55
The Armstrong court began its analysis by recognizing that
the Pennsylvania Legislature grants and limits the powers that
equity courts may exercise.56 The Armstrong court stated, how-
ever, that basic principles of equity are also determinative of the
courts' powers insofar as the powers are consistent with the pol-
icy underlying a legislative grant of powers.
57
52. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101-A (West Supp. 1996). See, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 372 A.2d 815 (Pa. 1977)(holding that Public Utility
Realty Tax Act ("PURTA") and county assessment laws are to be read in pari materia,
and applying county assessment case law to an interpretation of PURTA).
53. 595 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1995).
54. Armstrong, 595 A.2d at 1139.
55. Id. at 1140.
56. Id. at 1141. The fact that the legislature is the sole grantor of equity powers is
well recognized. Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners of Pa., 18 A. 291, 293-
95 (Pa. 1935Xanalyzing pre-Revolution origins of legislature's authority to grant and
limit equity powers). See also Calabrese v. Collier Twp. Mun. Auth., 240 A.2d 544, 547
(Pa. 1968)(stating that "the extent to which a court of common pleas may exercise...
chancery powers lies within the control of the legislature").
57. Armstrong, 595 A.2d at 1141-42. The policy underlying PERA is stated in sec-
tion 1101.101, which provides as follows:
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania declares that it is
the public policy of this Commonwealth and the purpose of this act to promote
orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and their
employes subject, however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this Common-
wealth to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, safety and welfare.
Unresolved disputes between the public employer and its employes are injurious to
the public and the General Assembly is therefore aware that adequate means must
be established for minimizing them and providing for their resolution. Within the
limitations imposed upon the governmental processes by these rights of the public
at large and recognizing that harmonious relationships are required between the
public employer and its employes, the General Assembly had determined that the
overall policy may best be accomplished by (1) granting the public employes the
right to organize and choose freely their representatives; (2) requiring public
employers to negotiate and bargain with employe organizations representing pub-
lic employes and to enter into written agreements evidencing the result of such
bargaining; and (3) establishing procedures to provide for the protection of the
rights of the public employe, the public employer and the public at large.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (West 1991).
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The Armstrong court then analyzed the language of PERA and
principles of equity.5" The court observed the plain language of
section 1101.1003 of PERA 9 and concluded that the legislature,
in enacting PERA, had clearly considered labor disputes in which
an injunction, by itself, would not sufficiently promote public
employer-employee relationships that would be conducive to set-
tling the labor disputes. 60 The court then declared that equity
courts have an inherent power to enforce their own decrees.'
The court noted that such inherent power necessarily extends to
enforcement of injunctions and the issuance of orders for carry-
ing decrees into effect.
62
Citing a second principle of equity, the Armstrong court noted
that a chancery court has power to retain jurisdiction for all pur-
poses of a dispute once it first retains jurisdiction over that dis-
pute.6 3 The court stated that chancery courts have a duty to
balance the equities for the entire dispute, and the duty in the
Armstrong case necessarily extended to ordering the negotiating
parties to hold bargaining sessions.64 The court's analysis of
PERA and equitable principles concluded with the court's obser-
vation that PERA is devoid of any explicit legislative directive
mandating a restriction on a chancery court's jurisdiction.6 5
Moreover, the court stated that such a restriction may not be
implied.6  The Armstrong court declared that it was "particu-
larly just and proper" for courts of equity to ensure that districts
enjoining teachers' strikes bargain with the teachers, and con-
cluded that the chancellor has the power to order court-moni-
58. Armstrong, 595 A.2d at 1142-44.
59. Section 1101.1003 of PERA expressly grants equity courts the power to decree
"equitable relief including but not limited to appropriate injunctions." PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, § 1101.1003 (West 1991). The supreme court interpreted this language to mean that
equity courts can impose conditions and regulations on any granted injunctions. Arm-
strong, 595 A.2d at 1142.
60. Armstrong, 595 A.2d at 1142. The court noted that reading section 1101.1003
of PERA as restricting a chancellor's powers was "absurd, unreasonable, and in contradic-
tion to well established principles of statutory construction." Id. at 1142.
61. Id. The court reasoned that without power to enforce its decrees, an equity
court would be useless. Id. at 1142.
62. Id. at 1143.
63. Id. The court cited Piercing Pagoda, Inc. v. Hoffner, 351 A.2d 207 (Pa. 1976) for
its holding-. "[w]here equity assumes jurisdiction for one or more purposes, it will retain
jurisdiction for all purposes to give complete relief and to do complete justice between the
parties. This may include an award of equitable relief not covered by the original prayer."
Id. (citing Piercing Pagoda, 351 A.2d at 213).
64. Id.
65. Armstrong, 595 A.2d at 1144.
66. Id.
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tored negotiations between the school board and teachers'
association. 7
School districts, their duly elected school boards and teachers
associations have long embroiled Pennsylvania communities in
bitter contract disputes that frequently impair the welfare of all
concerned parties.6 In recognition of this fact, the Pennsylvania
Legislature enacted Act 88, the legislative history of which
clearly indicates the legislature's intent to employ means that
effectively resolve such contract disputes without impairing the
collective bargaining rights of public school educators. 9
In resolving the labor dispute in Ringgold, the supreme court
properly precluded impairment of the teachers' collective bar-
gaining rights by following the dictate of Act 8870 to construe sec-
tion 11-1161-A of that act together with section 1101.1003 of
PERA, and apply PERA case law to Act 88. Additionally, by fol-
lowing Armstrong and recognizing that Pennsylvania equity
principles apply to the Ringgold case, the court avoided the ineq-
uitable result of allowing a school board to abdicate its responsi-
bility under PERA and avoid court-monitored negotiations
simply by waiting for the Secretary of Education to bring an Act
88 equity proceeding. 71 This anomalous result would have been
entirely inconsistent with the legislative intent of Act 88 as well
as the express public policy underlying PERA, the statute that
Act 88 amended.72
PERA's public policy provision acknowledges society's need for
constructive and harmonious relationships between public edu-
cators and school boards.73 The legislative history of Act 88 also
indicates the legislature's keen awareness of the need to be fair
to educators and school boards.7 ' When contract negotiations
67. Id. at 1140, 1143, 1144.
68. 175 PA. LEGIS. J. - SENATE 46, 872 (1991).
69. See, e.g., 175 PA. LEGIS. J. - SENATE 46, 872 (1991) (Senator Greenwood stated
that the methods chosen to resolve teachers' labor disputes should not "deprive [Penn-
sylvania's] valued educators of the means to bargain for fair and reasonable wages").
70. Section 6 of the Historical and Statutory Notes of Act 88 reads: "[PERA] is to
be read in pari materia with the addition of Article XI-A of the [Public School Code]. .. "
Section 6 of Act 1992, July 9, P.L. 403, No. 88, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101-A (West
Supp. 1996)(Historical and Statutory Notes).
71. Perhaps significantly, PERA and Act 88 standards differ dramatically as to
what is required of the party commencing the action. PERA requires a party to show the
existence of "a clear and present danger" to public health, safety or welfare, whereas Act
88 requires a party to show only the one hundred eighty day instruction requirement is in
jeopardy. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (West 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-
1161-A (West Supp. 1996).
72. See supra note 57 for the policy underlying PERA.
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.101 (West 1991).
74. 175 PA. LEGIS. J. - SENATE 46, 1135 (1991). Senator Reibman stated that the
solution to the issue of school strikes had to be fair to the educators, school boards, and
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between such parties reach an impasse, educator-board relations
are already strained. To enable the Secretary of Education to
unilaterally end a teachers' strike, without a court order mandat-
ing the educators and school board to negotiate, would be to
intensify these strained relations. Clearly, the school board
would have no incentive to bargain with a teachers' association
that has lost its most effective method of asserting its collective
bargaining rights. Additionally, the resulting lack of negotia-
tions cannot realistically be perceived as conducive to construc-
tive, harmonious and fair relationships between school boards
and educators.
Instead of choosing a course counterproductive to constructive
and harmonious relationships, the Ringgold court chose to recon-
cile the statutory rights of all parties. The court's holding that a
chancellor may settle a contract controversy, regardless of
whether the Secretary of Education, school district or school
board originates the suit, ensures that a neutral tribunal will
safeguard the statutory rights of all parties involved without
unduly impairing the educators' collective bargaining rights.75
In conclusion, Ringgold is a correct and appropriate decision
that necessarily follows from construing and applying Act 88 and
PERA together and applying Armstrong to the facts of Ringgold.
The decision is a manifestation of the legislature's express intent
that courts resolve contract disputes between school districts,
school boards and teachers' associations without impairing the
associations' right to bargain collectively. Any contrary holding
children of the Commonwealth. Id. Senator Greenwood also declared his concern for the
Commonwealth's teachers and children. Id. at 872.
75. The dissent's use of Masloff v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 613 A.2d
1186 (Pa. 1992), was misplaced. In Masloff, a transit local union engaged in a legal strike
that the City of Pittsburgh sought to end. Id. at 1187. The Port Authority Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 55, § 563.2 (1996), however, precluded any party other than the Port Authority
from enjoining local union strikes. Id. at 1189. The Act also required the Port Authority
and striking local union to engage in binding arbitration if the Port Authority enjoined a
local union's strike. Id. at 1192. In holding that the statutory restriction on parties with
standing to enjoin a strike was unconstitutional, the Masloff court did not order the Port
Authority and striking local into binding arbitration. Id. at 1192. The Masloff court rea-
soned that the legislature's intent with respect to binding arbitration was predicated on
the legislature's understanding that the Port Authority would be the only party able to
enjoin a strike. Id. at 1992. Since Masloff involved a party not covered by the applicable
statute, the court refused to infer that the legislature's intent would remain the same. Id.
at 1192.
Ringgold differs from Masloff in that the Secretary of Education in Ringgold had
statutory standing to enjoin strikes under section 11-1161-A of Act 88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 11-1161-A (West Supp. 1996). Furthermore, Act 88 expresses the legislature's
intent for courts to read Act 88 and PERA inpari materia. See Section 6 of Act 1992, July
9, P.L. 403, No. 88, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 11-1101-A (West Supp. 1996)(Historical and
Statutory Notes). Thus, unlike the Masloff court, the Ringgold court was not involved in
the divination of legislative intent.
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by the court would have only further alienated the parties
involved and resulted in more suffering by those who have the
greatest interest at risk in labor disputes: the children of the
Commonwealth.
Scott E. Mooney

